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Introduction
Can land tenure législation be modernised by integrating traditional chiefs into thé légal
framework and are tenure rules be clarifïed by referring to something as elusive as
custom? Legislators and planners of rural development in Niger seem to have been thus
persuaded when the new land tenure reform - the Code rural - was drawn up in the late
1980s and adopted in 1993 (Ordonnance no. 93-015 du 2 Mars 1993). The législation
has been considered path-breaking and innovative because it seeks to modernise tenure
rules without breaking with tradition. It seeks to elevate customs to law.
When thé government produces législation that is a codification of customs, chiefs are
central but their position is füll of ambiguity. Chiefs are regarded at once as guardians
of 'tradition' and as intermediaries betwèen state and society; they are continually
negotiating their social and politico-légal position vis-à-vis other politico-légal
institutions, in particular thé civil administration and thé judiciary (van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal n.d.; Lund 1997). The compétition over jurisdiction betwèen chiefs and thé
; government — generally the sous-préfets - is often characterised by self-contradictory
efforts by both to claim legitimacy in dispute resolution, and hence in thé interprétation
Ofrcustom and law. On the one hand, both attempt to maintain a strict séparation
\ betwèen their own realm and that of the other, in order to keep certain cultural
'" entiflements to legitimacy out of thé reach of other institutional actors. But at the same
' 'time each also tries to take possession of thé codes, norms and procedures of the other
^institutions whenever that seems expédient. Chiefs refer to themselves and their
:• jansdictions as based on 'tradition'. Their rôle as guardians of tradition is said to
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qualify them to décide how tradition is to be interpreted. However, chiefs are not able to j
monopolise références to tradition - thèse are often 'borrowed' by institutional actors %.
whose mandate is grounded elsewhere. Thus, thé government often takes thé Quran as a :j
normative referent for checking the validity of statements by litigants. Another way of J
establishing discursive boundaries and institutional domains is to claim that legality is |
thé constituent force of thé legitimate authority whereby politico-légal institutions may \
adjudicate in disputes and interpret the law. This is a strategy used typically by the i
governmental authorities - most commonly in direct confrontations with other politico- J
legal institutions, such as village and canton chiefs, to call them to order. Chiefs, for -\
their part, rarely employ formai administrative rhetoric in confrontations with \
governmental authorities, but they do invoke administrative hiérarchies and procédures 1
vis-à-vis farmers to assert their position in thé hierarchy and keep from being bypassed. j
The two sets of discourses are thus used for different purposes. Référence to tradition is |
used for asserting Substantive compétence or jurisdiction - knowledge about land «
tenure, légal processes and 'right and wrong'. Legitimation through référence to legality j
is used in asserting formai competencies or jurisdictions, their hierarchical order and the l
formai légal process of litigation. Both politico-légal institutions use rhetoric from both j
types of discursive domain, but they use it in différent confrontational situations. I
Since thé 1950s, relations between thé Nigérien state and chieftaincy have been l
characterised by a pendulous movement. In some periods, the political elite's efforts to
clip thé wings of chiefs and reduce them to mère auxiliary staff of the administration 3
gave rise to gréât animosity between thé two institutions; in other periods, chiefs hâve
been pivotai in thé political and social organisation and mobilisation of thé population. J
More recently thé rôle and legitimacy of chiefs is being sanctioned 'from above' by thé ']
constitution and various forms of législation. One significant pièce of législation is thê*j
Code rural (Bako-Arifari 1996; Lund 1995; Ngaido 1996). ^
Obviously a reform process under thé conditions just described is not without itslj
contradictions. We will examine some of them hère and show how they translate into
législative challenges. \«
-I
The Code rural \m
In most countries of the Sahel during the 1980s, attention was directed towards
tenure législation. A whole range of observations had been made by governments,
agencies and researchers concerning the stagnating rural development, thé degradatioraill
of the physical environment and thé détérioration of long-term productive capacitiesi
Land tenure insecurity was judged to be a key factor in such trends; legal reforms
considered a good way to establish tenure security, and thereby incentives for
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natural resource management.1 From its inception in the late 1980s, the project c
establishing a tenure reform - a Code rural - in Niger was an ambitious one. i
clarification of thé modes of tenure and of transfer of natural resources - land i
particular - was considered an important step towards reversing some of th
unfavourable trends.2 A spécial Secrétariat permanent du Code rural was establishe<
under thé Ministry of Agriculture with thé task of designing such a rural code. Th
people behind the reform efforts were keenly aware of thé importance of th
workability of the reform; they recognised the risk of drawing up something ver
elaborate and cohérent but impossible to implement. It was therefore their ambition ti
avoid changes in thé actual distribution of land while clarifying thé conditions unde
which that land was held. The permanent secretary of the Code rural in 1989, Miche
Keita, put it like this:
Rather than provoking an upheaval, this reform should bring about a
improvement of the existing situation. It is not a question of giving certain
forms of land tenure priority over others. This implies that the reform is
limited in the following ways:
- There will be no 'state ownership' of lands;
- Nor will there be 'de facto expropriation' on a national scale;
- Nor will the land be 'redistributed'.
But it is, nevertheless, our ambition to propose a law that will allow the
coordination of all the rights of the different right-holders (Keita 1989: 14,
our translation3'
In order to understand the different 'forms of land tenure', the authorities conducted <
series of regional seminars, from which a somewhat sketchy idea of the complexity o
the tenure situation emerged. One peculiar element was the overwhelming désire amonj
the various respondents for private property.4 It was decided that agricultural land couk
For a discussion of legal and institutional incentives for natural resource management, se
Hesseling 1996
This pohcy was sigmficantly fuelled by analyses and funding from various donors, m particulï
France, the United States and the World Bank (Comité ad hoc chargé de l'élaboration du Cod
Rural 1986; Caverivière 1989; Rochegude 1987).
'Plus qu'un bouleversement, ce code doit réaliser un aménagement de l'ensemble des réalité
existantes. Il n'est pas question de privilégier certains modes juridiques de maîtrise du sol pluté
que d'autres. Cela implique que la réforme est à la fois limitée:
- Il n'y aura pas 'd'étatisation' des terres, par exemple; - ni 'd'expropriation de fait' organisée
l'échelle nationale; - ni de 'redistribution de terres' mais également ambitieuse en ce sens qu'ell
vise à proposer un texte qui permette de coordonner les droits des divers utilisateurs du sol' (Keit
1989: 14).
Personal communication with Peter Bloch, Land Tenure Center, and Moussa Yacouba, Sécretana
du Code Rural. It is worth notmg hère that information was largely gathered from thé village ani
canton élites (Arrondissement de Mimah 1989:1), so it is not surpnsing that they should prefe
private property to be thé recognised prmciple of tenure.
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becotne thé private property of an individual, while pasturelands should be protected
common property with priority access for thé pastoral groups of the area.5
For thé agricultural land, private property was to be the culmination of a series of steps
towards officiai initial récognition. If customary rights could be asserted, a written
dossier rural was to be created, and thé rights would be transformed into private
ownership after an unspecified lapse of time. The political ambitions were therefore to
achieve a merger between tradition and modernity, rationalising thé tenure System
without breaking with tradition. Thus, the state would not grant modem property rights
to customary land owners, it would simply recognise them. The ways in which
customary rights were to be recognised were specified in Article 9 of the Principes
d'Orientation du Code Rural.6
Driven by thé désire to provoke as little disruption of social relations as possible and to
base any change on local Knowledge, rather loose and flexible concepts like 'time
immémorial', 'collective memory' and 'customs of the area' were accorded décisive
importance. The autorité coutumière compétente - i.e. thé canton chief - was
recognised as thé institution through which people must pass to get private property
rights formally established. Another decree from 1993 confirmed thé central rôle of mis
authority in thé event of disagreement about thé 'collective memory' or about what is
customary:
Decree no. 93-28 of 30 March 1993 concerning traditional chieftaincy in
Niger reaffirms that the traditional authorities décide on thé use by families
or individuals of cultivated land and other areas to which thé communities
under their authority hâve recognised customary rights (Secrétariat
permanent du Code rural 1994: 4-3, our translation7).
This last element créâtes problems of définition related especially to 'terroir d'attache', or 'land
where spécifie pastoral groups hâve access priority', in thé nomadic/pastoral zone.
'Customary property is thé resuit of 1) acquisition of land through succession, confirmed since
time immémorial by thé collective memory; 2) permanent allocation of land by a compétent
customary authority; 3) any means of acquisition recognised by local customs. Customary property
confers füll and effective ownership on thé proprietor.' ('La propriété coutumière résulte de: 1)
l'acquisition de la propriété foncière rurale par succession depuis des temps immémoriaux et
confirmée par la mémoire collective; 2) l'attribution à titre définitif de la terre à une personne par
l'autorité coutumière compétente; 3) tout autre mode d'acquisition prévu par les coutumes des
terroirs. La propriété coutumière confère à son titulaire la propriété pleine et effective de la terre.')
(our translation)
'Le décret no. 93-28 du 30 mars 1993 portant de la cheffene traditionnelle du Niger réaffirme que
les autorités coutumières règlent selon la coutume, l'utilisation par les familles ou les individus, des
terres de culture et espaces ruraux sur lesquels la communauté coutumière dont elles ont la charge,
possède des droits coutumières reconnus' (Secrétariat Permanent du Code Rural 1994:4-3).
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The pivotai éléments in the reform are customary rights and chiefs who are authorise
to interpret them. While chieftaincy was established and developed well befor
colonisation, it was transformed by thé French administration. The latter altered th
territorial jurisdictions of chiefs, modified their numbers, changed their prérogative
and integrated them into the state as administrative auxiliaries. In contrast to man
former French colonies, this organisation was maintained in Niger after independenc
(Guillemin 1983; Le Roy 1979:114; Raynal 1993; Robinson 1975; 1983; 1992).
A System of cantons and groupements was created by thé French colonie
administration between 1904 and 1924. Basic traditional entities were split up an
reorganised, and persons who had proved their loyalty to or compliance with thé Frêne
were appointed traditional leaders - canton chiefs.8 Generally, the Frenc
administration was careful to seek out candidates who had some claim to bein
noblemen (Olivier de Sardan 1984: 221). However, candidates also included people lik
interpreters, domestic servants of thé French, or African soldiers retired from thé Frenc
army9 (Gamory-Dubourdeau 1924; Abba 1990: 51; Salifou 1981; Fuglestad 1983: 84
89; Suret-Canale 1970: 64). Some chiefly claims to an ancient royal pedigree are henc
somewhat of a fabrication, as illustrated by thé anecdote about thé chiefs access to th
throne in thé Canton Gao.
Sometime in thé 1950s, a French film crew had visited Niger to document
traditional festivals, rites and ceremonies. The film crew's schedule did not
coïncide with thé death ofany canton chief and thé subséquent crowning of
his successor, so it was decided to stage one. The 'cinéastres' asked thé
canton chief of Gao ifhe would allow his son, Issaka Yahaya, to act out his
future crowning in thé documentary. The chief was dismayed, and refused to
allow it. Finally, hè did accept to let his Galadima [a Hausa terni for a kind
of minister of home affairs, Nicolas 1975] wear thé crowning outfit and
The qualities thé French desired of a chief were aptly illustrated m a letter from one Capitai
Brounin to his superiors in 1937: 'On a fait au chef de canton une bien triste réputation, la vér
m'oblige à dire qu'il présente à côté de défauts incontestables de sérieuses qualités qui so
l'endurance, la volonté, la perspicacité et l'autorité, il suffit de le secouer un peu et de le surveill
il a montré en plusieurs occasions qu'il était capable de décision; il se décharge aujourd'hui de
presque totalité de son travail sur son fils Yérima: personnage énergique, autoritaire, ambitieux
violent, son activité doit être contrôlée, peu aimé de tous il est craint et redouté; il possède
demeurant de réelles qualités de chef. Je pense pour l'avoir mainte fois constaté ailleurs que
meilleurs à nos yeux ne sont pas très bien vus de la population.' Zinder, 5 avril 1937. (Fn
Archives Nationales de la République du Niger, Niamey. Rapport de tourné dans le canton
Dogo, Zinder, 3-27 mars, 1937. Filed under: Zinder, 1937)
One of thé best researched examples is the story of Aouta from Dosso. From being a deprav
princeling with no authority or économie wealth struggling through as a rural merchant-cu
highwayman, he was enrolled as an 'agent politique auxilliaire' and subsequently appoml
Zarmakoye (leader of ail canton chiefs) of Dosso by thé French (Rothiot 1988).
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promenade on a horse bef ore the camera. The scènes were shot and the film
crew left.
The chief had previously had some controversy with the Sultan of Zinder -
the latter considérée that the canton chief owed him 900 measures of millet,
The chief did not accept this. 11 was by no means an unusual occurrence, but
it was successfully exploited by the ambitions Galadima when the real death
of the canton chief occurred. While Issaka Yahaya campaigned among the
village chief s in the Canton to become his father's successor, the Galadima
went to the Sultan. There hè struck a bargain: hè would pledge loyalty with
the Sultan and deliver the 900 measures of millet if the Sultan would support
his candidature. While the Galadima was not of the nablest blood, the
earlier documentary proved to the govemment authorities that hè was
indeed the dauphin and rightful heir to the title. Subsequently, he was
inscribed in the register as the state-recognised traditional chief with
corresponding prérogatives, notably to collect taxes, supervise land
transactions and résolve local disputes.
The followers of the previous chief soon found their postures and fallowed
fields under the control of this new and energetic chief who was eager to
make money by granting-cum-selling access to allégea unoccupied land.
Thenceforth, spite and vendetta characterised relations between Issaka
Yahaya and the new canton chief. (Lund 1995: 91)
Canton chiefs became the link between the emerging modern state and the population.
The colonial administrator depended on the canton chiefs for maintaining law and order
and for tax collection, and this social position gave the chiefs several advantages. The
French colonial officer was supposed to dispense justice according to légal décisions
and local customs. For this, he depended entirely upon the partly-invented chiefs, and
this left considérable scope for the imaginative and opportunistic invention of
customs.10 This legal set-up not only had conséquences for the primary rules about who
is entitled to what. It also put the power of secondary rule-making - the power to make
rules about how to décide who is entitled to what - in the hands of chiefs.
How did this affect the development of various customs relating to land tenure?
Customary land rights have always been somewhat ambiguous. If we take the customs
prevailing in South Central and Southeastern Niger, where the Hausa culture is
dominant,
"-f
Arbitrary advice was frequent, and this encouraged the colonial administration to record local
customs 'once and for all' in order to estabhsh an unambiguous base for the rule of law. The
Nigérien Rural Code is therefore by no means the first attempt m Francophone West Afnca to
merge tradition with modern law (Blanc-Jouvan 1971). According to Le Roy (1991b) this type of
recording has been undertaken since 1905 Evidently, none of these efforts has solved the problems
'once and for all'
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the ambiguity between the rights of the descendants of the first occupant and the actual
tiller of the soil allows for various interprétations.
Tenure Systems are closely connected with production. When land was in abundance,
shifting cultivation on the communal fields of the extended household was the most
common mode of production, and fallow of long duration followed some years of
cultivation. In practice, if an individual brought uncultivated land in the bush under
cultivation, hè would do this as a member of a lineage, performing its particular cults;
the land would thereby enter the patrimony of his clan and lineage. The person (and
household) cultivating the land retained the right to do so until they ceased cultivation
and no tracé of cultivation remained. Their rights entitled them to use it, but not to seil
it, and their rights were extinctive, i.e. if they ceased to cultivate it they would
eventually lose their rights to the land (Raulin 1965: 134; Latour-Dejean 1973: 6). This
interprétation of tenurial rights accords primacy to work as the feature that defines
rights. The one who tills the soil has an inaliénable right to continue doing so, and to
enjoy the fruits of that labour. The right to control the land was thus limited to the time
the farmers themselves farmed it, and it did not include control of it after transfer to
another.
Competing notions of property rights also prevailed, however. Migration, settlement
and the increased commercialisation in the zone seem to have favoured notions of non-
extinctive rights. The évolution of certain rights of inheritance, combined with the
growth of a more hierarchical social structure, influenced the concept of land tenure and
undermined the older principles.
Thus, even if land was abandoned, the person who first cleared the land (and his
descendants) retained a prééminent right to it. This hereditary right of the first occupant
was not affected by the actual land use. The land could be cultivated or could lie fallow
for many years, but the first occupant and his descendants still retained a prééminent
right to it (Latour-Dejean 1973: 6). The right to control thus seemed inaliénable. The
transfer of land to households outside the first occupant's lineage established a soit of
landlord-tenant relationship, so that the founding lineage of a village constituted a class
of landowners. Important members of this group became the nobles. In this line of
reasoning, the notion of extinctive rights pertained to the actual household and its
access and cultivation of the land. So, contrary to the norms in the previously described
system, the access right, rather than the right of control, was extinctive.
On top of this ambiguous normative repertoire came state régulation and a récognition
of the tenure system through the tax system. The colonial administration
institutionalised the payment of taxes to both the state and chiefs. As tax collectors,
chiefs were given a percentage of state taxes, and this incentive to zealous collection
has been maintained to this day. At the same time, however, a new fiscal tradition was
also invented. While gifts had, of course, been offered to chiefs before, it was during
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thé period of colonisation that tithes to chiefs were sanctioned as an obligation.
However, as Olivier de Sardan has observed, 'The tithe is neither a traditional concept,
nor a légal one; nor is it a religious obligation, a political institution or a land tax; it is a
bone of contention' (1989: 224, our translation"). Thus, thé tithe has no clear
normative référence but is an ambiguous and negotiable sociopolitical transaction.
Nonetheless, tithe payments were also linked to thé tenurial status and rights of the
chieftaincy.
The position of thé colonial administration was also ambiguous. In thé first place, it
asserted the state's ultimate right to land, and any spécifie land rights were granted in
principle by the state. The administration recognised farmers' use-rights and local
tenure customs only as long as thèse were considered use-rights only.
The colonial criterion for retaining thé use-right was that the land was being 'put to
use' (mise en valeur). On the one hand, this concept favoured some of the local
interprétations of custom, whereby those who work on the land hold the use-right for as
long as they continue to work. On the other hand, the state depended heavily on
chieftaincy for thé administration of thé colony and did not seriously challenge thé
authority of the chiefs vis-à-vis the farmers. It therefore also supported thé notion of an
inaliénable right vested in thé chiefs to central land allocation, and it regarded thé tithe
as thé commoner's payaient to thé chief for being allowed to cultivate the land. The
tenancy relationship that existed before colonisation between thé first occupant and thé
person cultivating the land, thereby had a generalised version of a tenancy contract
superimposed upon it in many cases. Vast tracts of land were declared terres de
chefferie, or 'chiefs' land', during the création of the chieftaincy by the colonial rulers.
This ambiguity persisted after independence. The successive governments needed
populär legitimacy, and it was especially important for the government and the central
administration - composed of the educated, political, urban elite with ambitions of
modernisation - to limit the political, social and economie power of chiefs.
Both the Diori government (1960-74) and the Kountché government (1974-1987) took
steps to curtail the powers of the chieftaincy and landowners vis-à-vis the use-right
holders (Ngaido 1993: 3; Charlick 1991). The payment of tithes was therefore
prohibited in 1960, and a series of other laws were enacted during the 1960s.12
11 'La dîme n'est d'abord ni un concept traditionnel, ni une notion juridique, ni une obligation
religieuse, ni une institution politique, ni une redevance foncière: c'est un enjeu' (Olivier de Sardan
1989: 224).
12 The most significant of these laws were 1) the Act of 25 May 1960 (Loi no. 60-28), which set the
conditions for developing and managing stale-funded irrigation projects; 2) the Act of 25 May
1960 (Loi no. 60-29), which prohibited the payment of tithes; 3) the Acts of 26 and 27 May 1961
(Loi nos. 61-5 and 61-6), which fixed the northern limit for erop cultivation and declared the land
north of that line to be reserved for pastoralism. This limit was meant to separate the different
régions of Niger by vocation; 4) the Act of 19 July 1961 (Loi no. 61-30), which laid down the
procedures for confirmmg or expropriating customary tenure rights; 5) the Act of 12 March 1962
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Generally, the formai abolition of the tithe provoked a large number of conflic
between use-right holders and owners of the land, with the latter defying the ban ar
insisting that tithes be paid or some other symbolic payment be made in récognition <
their continued ownership. Basically, the acts and decrees had little fundamental impa
on the powers of chiefs; the laws were simply not obeyed. Nor did people claim form
title to their land, even though that was the intention of the 1961 law (Loi 61-30). Tl
non-enforcement of all these laws and decrees can be seen as a conséquence of tl
state's, and in particular the local administration's, dependence on the chiefs and tl
authority they wielded over the genera! population. In spite of rhetoric and ambitioi
intentions to clip the chiefs' wings, little was effectively done to weaken their positio
Rather, a profusion of ambiguous enactments, decrees and other authorised interpr
tations in the form of political speeches were propagated (see Ngaido 1996 for details)
Like his predecessor, President Kountché sought populär legitimacy for his regin
partly by attempting to limit chiefly powers and gain the support of the farmers. Rig
after his 1974 takeover, Kountché declared on national radio that all land, no matt
how it had been acquired and no matter what tenure rules it was held under, shou
henceforth be the private property of the person cultivating it (Rochegude 1987).
The fundamental ambiguity of tenure matters was compounded once again, however, l
another décision to give local governmental and traditional institutions the mandate
médiate and résolve tenure conflicts. In a 1975 ordinance (Ordonnance no. 75-7), t
préfet, the sous-préfet, the canton chief and the village chief were endowed with t
power to conciüate in tenure conflicts (Ngaido 1993a: 9). This opportumty to reass<
their privileges and prérogatives was not neglected by the chiefs. This again led
conflicts between use-right holders and the nobility and landowners, and the govei
ment resorted to issuing decrees and circulars which again aimed at curtailing chiei
power.13 The most significant of these first limited, and then in 1977 forbade, t
participation of local government and the chiefs in land conflict resolution. Despite tl
new decree, neither the conflicts nor their sources disappeared. Consequently,
chiefs; and 6) the Decree of 29 May 1962 (Décret no. 62-128/PRN/SEP), which determmed
composition and opération of the committees charged with assessing the number of plots contro
by traditional chiefs and the farmers cultivating those plots. These committees were composée
government officials, depuües and chiefs.
13 The most important measures to be introduced were: 1) The 16 December 1977 Circular l
8/MI/SG) formally prohibited local authorities, administrative as well as customary, fi
participatmg m any procedure for resolving litigations over plots. 2) The 24 April 1980 Circi
(no. 12/MI/SG/CIRC) quoted the president's speech to the nation which had stipulated that
local administrative and traditional authorities should not be involved in any cases of con!
resolution. 3) The annual circular (no. 004/MJ/GS) forbade any resolution of land litigation fro
April to 31 October each year In addition, in the event of litigation, a plot was to remain under
control of the farmer who had cultivated it the previous year 4) A 1983 act required that every
be registered m their village of résidence This meant that the farmers were registered in
villages where they had their lands. In cases where the village they hved m and the village wl
they had their land were different, many Problems arose, such as conflicts between cantons
between villages.
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institution had legal jurisdiction in land tenure questions; no conflict had a predictable
course; and none of the institutions operating in the rural areas had formal powers to
give a final, let alone written, décision in land conflicts. The result was an absolute
intransparency of rules and jurisprudence. Everything was in limbo.
With the Code rural, the pendulum has now swung back once more, and chiefs have
now again become pivotai in the defming of tenure rules meant to embody the customs
the new law is based on.
Contradictions and législative challenges
Basing the tenure reform on local custom is appealing because of its seeming simplicity.
However, it does raise a series of questions: How will chiefs détermine local customary
law? Will it be possible to maintain the flexible, dynamic character of local tenure
arrangements in Niger, which, both historically and in the present-day, ensure that
several groups of users can exercise claims on natural resources in a given territory,
either simultaneously or in séquence. Will the reforms alter the social structures of
society? While füll Implementation of the rural code is still a long way off, the history
and the recent development of Niger enable us to discuss some of these points.
Customary legal procedure and the new rural code
The Code rural opérâtes on the concepts of 'time immémorial' and 'collective
memory'. Property rights are thereby recognised if the land has been in the claimant's
possession since 'time immémorial'. How will the 'collective memory' and 'time
immémorial' be established; whose memory epitomises the collective memory and how
far back can we go? In a society where history is almost exclusively oral, historical facts
and events undergo often unnoticeable changes over time. Like any other country in
West Africa, Niger has a long history of migration and seulement, and there have
probably been several 'first occupants' of many places. Hence, a situation often prevails
where several 'truths' are possible, and this makes legal procedure a crucial moment.
Whenever a chief is approached to settle a conflict over land, unsettled debts, divorces
or whatever, gifts change hands. Not only do plaintiffs and their adversaries present
gifts at their audiences and convocations; after closure of the case the 'winners' offer
gifts to display their gratitude, while the 'losers' give them as a token of appréciation
that the judgment was moderate.
In practical terms, plaintiffs and défendants are summoned by the canton chief to take
an oath on the Quran in support of their claims. Religion is an important normative
referent, and swearing on the Quran is almost universally accepted to be a gesture of
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truth. The use of the Quran to check the veracity of statements in legal procedures
very common. Lying while under oath subjects the perjurer to unpleasant supernatu
sanctions such as leprosy and impoverishment. This doctrine, warning of the gr
conséquences of violating what has been made sacred by using the Quran, is widi
believed to be true in Niger. As a result of the doctrine's pervasive power, the Qurati
widely invoked in disputes, by chiefs and administrative authorities alike, especially i
sous-préfets. To décline to subject oneself to 'Quranic trial' is effectively admitting c
is in the wrong. It has a further effect as well. Tactics of manipulation are recounted
anecdotes and stories, such as 'Some people have their old folks swear since they
going to die soon anyway' or 'The Quran was not hand-written, but from a print)
house, so it had no power.' Hence, the result of employing the Quran is ambiguous:
individual fears it, but suspects that others fear it less. Since an oath on the Quran has
be ordered by the canton chief, hè is in a position to control the situation to a lai
extent.
Furthermore, hearings are often riddled with 'traps'. For example, if a chief ai
someone to state who first authorised their (or their ancestors') settlement, this persoi
trapped. If they answer 'thé chief, then they recognise that thé chief has thé authoi
over the land and that they themselves do not own and control it. If they answer
one, we were the first', then they find themselves in deeper trouble, since they then
admit having defïed the politico-légal authority of the chiefs by just squatting on
land. The recall of 'collective memory' and the time period 'since time immémorial'
thus highly manipulable concepts, and the chiefs benefit greatly from the bribes that
forthcoming.
Ruralproperty and the customary notion of 'time'
In both the French and the Anglo-Saxon légal traditions, proprietors must make tl
ownership known if another person is found to be using (cultivating) their prope
Failure to do so generally leads to the loss of the property after a certain period, 20,
or perhaps 50 years. The person using the property in ignorance of another 'owne
existence will thenceforth be considered the owner (Ouedraogo et al. 1996: annexe
6; Rose 1994: 11 ff.). Since the Code rural contains no time limit to render clai
outdated, the door is opened to indefinite claims, which will be dealt with in the hig
manipulable procedure of providing proof.
As we have noted above, two different and often conflicting customs bear upon
question of which right will be transformed into the right of private property: Is it
inaliénable right of the first occupant - mterpreted m many cases as the chief -
control the distribution of the land, or is it the inexpropriable use-right of the pres
tenants? Since the reform holds out a future récognition of 'owners', those who
bolster their claims with références to 'traditional ownership' seem to be ahead of th
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who must count on 'traditional use-rights'. This seems even more likely if we consider
the influence chiefs have on the interprétation of customs. This results in two very
different outcomes for farmlands and pasturelands.
In cases of conflict between farmers over the ownership of a field, the 'inexpropriable,
time-honoured' right of the actual user gives way to the 'inaliénable' right of the first
occupant, no matter how much time has passed. Good political connections and sound
finances enabling bribery may then still make it possible to successfully take up the case
again with the canton chief.
The importance of custom in the reforms gives chiefs a particularly favourable position
when it comes to uncultivated lands. Such areas may be considered to be for pastoral
use, but since no resource user is exploiting them in thé conventional way (that is,
cultivating them), they may also be considered chiefs' lands, even though that concept
has been officially abolished.
Thus, in contrast with disputes between farmers over a cultivated field, the time elapsed
need not always be so long to establish ownership in disputes over pastures. Whilst
claims to a pastoral area for cultivation are generally backed by précédents, often thé
precedent only dates back to thé previous year. It is therefore very rare for farmers to be
evicted from what has been a pasture since 'time immémorial'. If cultivation has
already taken place, the farmer can usually stay on. Many pastures are under pressure.
The extension of cultivated fields into thé pastoral areas is the prédominant trend, even
to the point that it is seen as a minor victory for pastoralists if they manage to maintain
thé status quo. Although some degree of interest in protecting thé pastures can be
detected among canton chiefs and civil servants, it seems to give way as soon as thé
confrontation becomes intense. Numbers may also be important in some ways: thé
farmers constitute a larger tax base for thé canton chief, but a large group may also
appear threatening. We illustrate how some of thé ambiguities of the status of thèse
lands has been exploited by chiefs:
Assistant sous-préfet confronts canton chief - but a compromise is reached
When Manzo's father settled in thé village of Dinney in thé 1960s he got
some plots of land with the help of thé village chief. With thé division of
property upon thé death of Manzo's father, thé plots had become too small
to satisfy Manzo's needs. In 1994 Manzo and his cousin and neighbour,
Ajagoula, asked thé canton chief of Gao for land. The chief mode sure that
the requested land was not in the vidnity of a well or a caille corridor, and
he assigned some additional land in the pastures to Manzo and his cousin
for money, but we do not know how much. The field was demarcated by one
ofthe chiefs courtiers.
A group ofcattle owners who used thé area for pasture went to see Salissou,
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since hè was considered a man of wit and courage and was suspected of
harbouring a grudge against Manzo, whose origins were lost in the past but
a genuine grudge nonetheless. Atfirst, Salissou went to the canton chiefto
ask him to withdraw Manzo's licence to cultivate in the pasture. The chief
refused, claiming a right to seil his canton if it pleased him. Expecting this
type of answer, Salissou, unabashed, went to the sous-préfet in Mirriah
town and obtained a summonsfor Manzo, Ajagoula and the canton chief on
the disputed land, and a new round of negotiation ensued.
On the day of the seulement, the assistant sous-préfet argued mat the chef
de canton was in no position to seil land in the common postures and that
Manzo would have to abandon his new field. The chief, on the other hand,
maintained that hè was entitied to do so, and that it was unacceptable if the
assistant sous-préfet insisted, since his credibility as a chief was at stake.
The assistant sous-préfet did, nevertheless, insist and asked the neighbours
of Manzo and Ajagoula to show the boundary between the pasture and the
fields. This was done, andfrom here the sources differ somewhat: Salissou
claimed that the assistant sous-préfet asked both Manzo and Ajagoula to
vacate their new fields, while Manzo claimed that only Ajagoula was asked
to do so. However, regarding the result their stories concurred: Ajagoula
abandoned his field first, but when he saw that Manzo did not, he also
recommenced cultivation, and both continued to cultivate their fields when
the assistant sous-préfet went back to his office in town.
The result of the confrontation between Manzo and the pastoralists thus
tumed into a dispute over authority between the assistant sous-préfet and
the canton chief. The dispute seemed to be impossible to settle without one
of them going back on their word, but a subtle kind of compromise was
actually reached. The assistant sous-préfet managed to retain his formal
authority by demonstrating that hè could overrule the canton chief and
décide on the protection of the postures (which was the objective of his
mission). The canton chief succeeded in retaining effective authority,
however, since his décision to grant Manzo and Ajagoula land also carried.
The décision was formally reversed, but it was effectively maintained -
though not as status quo. The f act that Manzo and Ajagoula got away with
it, so to speak, was a message to their farming neighbours and the real root
of anxiety among the pastoralists. The confrontation would buttress the
image of the canton chief among his subjects as someone who stands upfor
them and was not shoved around by the administration. (Lund 1995:141).
This case may give the impression that the canton chief is generally amenable to
cultivation of pastureland. Indeed hè is, unless the pastoral interests are important - that
is, if hè would benefit financially from defending them. This does not mean that
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pastureland in the agricultural zone is doomed, but that enterprising, experienced and
committed political protection and leadership on behalf of pastoral interests are
probably necessary prerequisites. And such is generally in short supply.
When the notion of pastoral lands and the rights of spécifie groups to these lands need
to be established in practice, a number of unresolved questions are set to pose
challenges to the legal System: How will these groups be defined? Can pastoral
producers cultivate fields in pastures and, if so, how can cultivation by others be
prevented (morally and practically)? How will priority access be understood; does it
imply the right to exclude others (and if so whom)? etc. If these questions are left for
the canton chiefs to décide, traditional pastoral groups are bound to lose out.
The problem of codification
A fundamental contradiction in the Code rural endeavour is the ambition to codify
tenure rules while not disturbing thé prevailing situation. The planners assumed that if
they just codified thé situation as it was, nothing would change dramatically. However,
it is thé codification itself which constitutes thé greatest change. And this is so at several
levels simultaneously.
The announcement of thé tenure reform amounted to an invitation to hâve customary
rights in land recognised now in order to secure irrévocable private property rights later.
'Get your customary rights to your land recognised before your neighbour does' seems
to be thé maxim distilled from thé Code rural by thé général population. Thus, while
several différent customary norms prevail and could potentially be invoked in support of
property claims, thé Code rural has now injected an idea of deadline into society.
Studies by Ngaido (1996) and Lund (1993; 1995) show that as a conséquence of the
announcement of the reform, the number of disputes brought before thé canton chiefs
and thé administrative and judicial authorities has increased substantially. The Code
rural did not cause such disputes, but it has unleashed them. In addition, political
conditions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the downfall of the military regime
and emerging political democracy, gave rise to a général contestation of thé authority of
politico-légal institutions, including that of chieftaincy. People hâve more readily
rejected légal settlements and appealed. Thus, while thé Code rural has triggered a large
number of disputes, thé nature of dispute settlement also seems to hâve undergone some
transformation.
Codification also means change at a différent level. Récent dispute settlements by
chiefs seem to point in a certain direction: that thé person granted property rights to thé
soil becomes owner and controller of all the natural resources attached to it, without
seasonal interruption. This can resuit in a marginalisation of the secondary use-rights
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that historically hâve characterised thé production system - fruit collection, dry-seas<
grazing and other such uses of cultivated fields. Codification thus also tends to imp
simplification. While thé cohabitation of différent user groups has historically been
source of both conflict and coopération, codification will mean a once-and-for-i
récognition of one group's rights at thé expense of thé others, with thé permane
éviction of thé latter as a conséquence. This is likely to usher in bitter conflicts alor
ethnie Unes on a massive scale.
At yet a différent level, the reform has boosted thé social position of chiefs. Settling tr
increasing numbers of disputes has yielded many chiefs a windfall income, and thé rus
on thé pastures seems to be a virtual 'money-machine' in some parts. Conversel;
tenure security seems to hâve declined markedly for those who hâve neither capital ne
sociopolitical connections to protect them from others' claims to their land.
Finally, at a more général level, the reform - the codification - signifies a change in th
relations between society and the state, in the form of both government authorities an
thé chieftaincy. Transactions that previously took place under informal, privat
conditions, with thé threat of intervention from thé chief as a potential disciplinar
sanction, now appear to provoke direct formai intervention from a politico-legs
institution, namely thé chiefs. Historically, unequivocal exactitude was neither requirei
nor desired, since land resources were more plentiful and transactions could hol<
multiple meanings. When land was transferred from A to B, it could be a loan, a gift o
merely A showing B a good spot. Such transactions, which historically required les
formai intervention from thé authorities, are now frequently the object of lega
proceedings by canton chiefs, sous-préfets and magistrales, and thé présent need fo
exactitude is projected into past transactions that were by nature opaque.
State régulation of tenure disputes has not only been accompanied by extension of th«
activities of légal or administrative authorities, but also by increased competitior
between thé différent politico-légal institutions. This has developed into quite i
paradox. Because settlements are more readily rejected, thé litigants take their cases
from one institution to thé other, exploiting this institutional compétition. On thé othei
hand, it would appear that some kind of socio-légal umpire is desired (otherwise people
could hâve just ignored thé settlements), and that rather man rejecting the state, rural
citizens invoke state power in existing institutions. Thus, state control or arbitration is
asked for by thé citizens, not merely inflicted upon them. Consequently, the reform has
thus far produced more régulation of society by politico-légal institutions, at a time
when thé legitimacy of thèse institutions is declining.
Legislators face a continuai dilemma: To what extent should laws reflect reality, and to
what extent should they change it? The Nigérien expérience shows that even if you only
want to reflect reality, thé reflection itself changes it.
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Conclusion
Many efforts at institutional reform in Africa have been hampered by the neglect of the
existing politico-légal infrastructure. The Nigérien Code rural process stands out as an
ambitieus attempt to put that infrastructure to constructive use. There are a number of
weaknesses in the reform, however.
The overall aim of enhancing tenure security has been turned into a transformation of
certain customary rights to private property. This reflects a simplistic notion of
customary tenure, and it proposes a linear transformation of tenure regimes which is
patently inadéquate. Secondary right-holders such as pastoralists and women also merit
a degree of security of access and exploitation of spécifie resources. Therefore much
more creativity is required to accommodate thé nuances and thé flexibility of local
land, use practices into a codified form of customs. Différent degrees of restrictions on
thé rights of primary right-holders to exclude others should be conceptualised. That
would facilitate local negotiations that could do justice to thé specificity of the varied
localities in Nigérien society.
The idea of modernising rules on the basis of what is known to the population, thereby
relying on institutions more decentralised than any purely civil servant-based
administration could ever be, is certainly worth pursuing. Nevertheless, thé develop-
ments in Niger also show it is naïve to trust in thé ability of custom and chiefs to steer
by themselves towards good governance, rule of law and social justice. A major
challenge is therefore how to subject the chiefs and customs to public or démocratie
control without undercutting their authority. The chiefs have been regarded as
instruments for implementing thé Code rural, and their rôle and capacities as quite
static. However, expérience shows that chiefs readily project their authority into thé
rather différent rôles of 'administrators' of land rights and 'judges' in disputes. Chiefs
are not mère réceptacles of authority which can be opened and shut according to thé
needs of thé legislators. Quite thé contrary, chiefs are capable political actors in pursuit
of interests. This may or may not favour thé Implementation of the Code rural.
Consequently, if thé chiefs are to hâve a central rôle in the reform, a serious effort to
secure their commitment to thé policy objectives seems absolutely essential. This, in
turn, implies political negotiations to establish their rôle and to train them to perform it
well. One key aspect of their rôle that needs clarification is to what extent thé chiefs
should be mère mediators (as the text of the law prescribes) or should have the
authority to décide on disputes (as is often the practice). A pragmatic first step would
be to modernise recording procedures. If the outcome of the litigation process at the
level of thé chiefs were to be put in writing, it would matter less whether it was a
'settled' or 'mediated' outcome that is being pursued further in thé legal system, and in
theory it could increase transparency and facilitate thé chiefs' accountability.
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The odds are, however, that written records would still have a limited effect as long as
the average rural Nigérien is illiterate and ill-organised in unions or interest groups, thus
remaining unequipped to confront and control authority.
The Implementation of a legal reform, and especially a land tenure reform, in a society
so immediately dependent on ils natural resources is bound to have repercussions on
social and political institutions. Even when labelled traditional, these are contemporary
and modem, and they are constantly being renegotiated through thé political process. If
reformers disregard this, they run the risk of becoming policymakers in the virtual
reality of their imaginations, thereby missing the point entirely.
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